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Abstract
In [1, 2], a distributed scheme allowing any number of members to compute a common secret without revealing
individual secret was proposed. We present a security weakness of this protocol. In doing so, we show that any
two members can collude and obtain the secret contributed by middle member in generating the common secret.
1 Introduction
In two party computation, if there is no external collaborator, the issue of collusion does not arise. The user
collusion is a problem where two or more parties collaborate and compute a certain quantity that may be otherwise
not accessible to them under the protocol construct. Hence, the collusion is a \failure state" of a given security
protocol. The user collusion also is a very commonly ignored but potentially costly problem due to either the lack
of awareness of it.
Some of the recently proposed multiparty computing schemes [5, 6, 1, 2] suer from collusion and often fail if two
members collaborate, regardless of the size of the group. Hence, from the security view point, these schemes don't
scale well.
In [7], we presented analysis of the collusion problem in the recently proposed secure multicast schemes [5, 6]. In
this paper, we present the collusion problem with the distributed secret computation scheme in [1, 2].
We rst present the problem using an application as in [1, 2]. We then present the solution in [1, 2]. We then show
how the collusion trivially breaks this system.
1.1 Problem Description
Consider a situation where there are n members each of whom have an individual secret. Problem is to nd a scheme
that will allow these set of members to compute the sum of individual secret without exposing it.
To use the application context in [1, 2], consider a class where there are n students. The class is supposed to have
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worked on a problem on an average of T hours. The teacher wants to know the average amount of time spent by the
class on the project.
Another application is where the each of the n members have some valuable information that when added with lead
to a joint secret. This valuable information may be the total amount of wealth in the group, or the total score of the
group etc.
Another application is the need to compute a common secret with individual shares such that at the time of combining
the shares, no individual share is exposed. We note that this requirement eliminates techniques based on polynomials
being candidates [4]. This is due to the fact that at the time of joint secret construction, all the shares have to be
exposed for proper polynomial interpolation.
1.2 Proposed Existing Solution in [1, 2]
In [1, 2], the following solution was proposed. We present the solution as a set of steps but the idea is the same.
1. Implicit indexing among members is assumed.
2. The rst member generates a random number  and adds his/her secret 1to it, and securely communicates
+ 1 to the second member.
3. For i = 2   n  1
member i adds its secret i to the quantity  +
Pi 1
j=1 j securely received from member i   1 and securely
communicates +
Pi
j=1 j to member i+ 1.
4. Member n receives the quantity +
Pn 1
j=1 j securely communicated by member n  1, adds its secret n and
securely communicates the result +
Pn
j=1 j to the rst member.
5. First member removes the value  and extracts the common secret
Pn
j=1 j .
This approach prevents a member from knowing the individual secret of any other member. The computations scale
linearly as a function of group size in this approach. We now show the problem with this method.
1.3 The user collusion Problem
Let members i and i+2 be collaborators. After computing the quantity +
Pi
j=1 j , it securely communicates it to
member i+ 1. It also securely communicates the quantity (without the knowledge of member i ) to member i+ 2.
The unsuspecting member i + 1 computes the secret  +
Pi
j=1 j and securely communicates it to member i + 2.
Using these two quantities, member i+2 can extract the secret of member i+1 in a straight forward manner. Hence,
the individual secret is not guarded against collusion in this approach. Implicit assumption of this formulation is the
system be free of any collusion among group members.
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2 Trusted Third Party
It is possible to add veriable secret exchange component to make sure that all the members communicate the shares
that they claim to be sending. Adding veriable secret also will prevent the rst member from cheating at the time
of extracting the nal joint secret. However the user collusion described in this paper is removable with a trusted
third party or a benign \information theoretic helper". In this approach the following steps are needed.
 Trusted third party provides individual pads to members.
 Individual members add their secrets to the pads.
 All the members combine their padded secrets using the procedure described earlier.
 The rst member then returns the padded joint secret to the trusted third party.
 The trusted third party then removes the combined padding and return the joint secret to the members.
One can add veriable secret generation to this procedure.
3 Conclusion
We identied a security weakness due to user collusion in a recently proposed distributed secret generation procedure.
We showed that the scheme fails if two members collude. We also provided a trusted third party based common
secret computing.
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